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Re: [STDS-802-16-MOBILE] Keying material suggestion



Title: Message
Better, but still a problem with the language. Language should only apply when MSS intends to maintain security context. There should be no implication that the MSS is forced to re-connect to the network even if it is 'powered-down' or has discontinued interest in its connection to the network.
 
Thanks,
Phil
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 12:55 PM
Subject: [STDS-802-16-MOBILE] Keying material suggestion

Please comment on the clarifications on keying material provided below. I know its too late to get into the ballot, However I do value your comments.
 
An Sac's keying material [e.g. Data Encryption Standard  (DES) key and CTC Initialization Vector] has a limited lifetime.  When the BS delivers SA keying material to an SS, it also provides the SS with that material's remaining lifetime.  It is the responsibility of the SS to request new keying material from the BS before the set of keying material that the SS currently holds expires at the BS.  Should the current keying material expire before a new set of keying material is received, the SS shall perform network entry as described in 6.3.9.  Should the authorization keying material or keying material associated with the primary SA expire, the SS shall perform network entry as described in 6.3.9.  Should the keying material associated with a static or dynamic SA expire, the BS removes SA keying material.  The PKM protocol specifies how SS and BS maintain key synchronization.
 
Thanks,
 
Steve