Status of Project IEEE P802.11bt - Post Quantum Cryptography
Stephen Orr (Cisco), Chair
Mark Hamilton (Commscope/Ruckus), Vice-Chair
Alex Lungu (Samsung), Vice-Chair
Blanca Wong Mosquera (Cisco), Secretary
Jay Yang (ZTE), Editor
Classic public key cryptography, for example key exchanges based on Diffie-Hellman (both finite field and elliptic curve) and digital signatures based on the RSA cryptosystem, is vulnerable to compromise from a quantum computer adversary. There is a strong market need to define post-quantum protocols that support algorithms that are resistant to attacks by quantum computers (a.k.a. quantum-resistant) in the standard to address this anticipated vulnerability. As an example, the United States National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) will disallow use of key establishment and digital signatures based on classic cryptography for use in US government systems after 2035. NIST has published new post-quantum algorithms for use in key establishment and digital signature protocols. In addition, the European Commission encourages Member States to develop comprehensive national strategies for PQC adoption. It is believed that these requirements will also appear in other market verticals (e.g., consumer, financial, etc.).
Goals
This amendment extends 802.11 security to support algorithms for post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The extension specifies:
authentication and key management (AKM) suites for PQC,
digital signature and key establishment algorithms that use PQC,
a password authenticated key exchange that uses PQC, and
modifications to key handshake protocols for PQC.
Approved PAR and CSD for P802.11bt Post Quantum Cryptography
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