Hi Graham and All,
A couple questions/comments:
- Graham what was your motivation to restrict this mechanism to a BPE AP? I don’t think it is a necessary restriction.
- I think the proposed requirement could be more clearly stated so the privacy advantage is clearer, how about:
11bi shall define at least one mechanism that will allow an non-AP STA to verify the identity of a known AP prior to transmission of any pre-association PPDUs to the AP. This mechanism should allow the non-AP STA to limit its transmission of Probes Requests
and Association Requests to a known AP to a location where the known AP is actually present (i.e., not to a spoofed AP).
Regards,
Joseph
From: G Smith <gsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2022 12:03 PM
To: STDS-802-11-TGBI@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [STDS-802-11-TGBI] Protection against Spoof AP
Thank you for the comments and feedback on 22/1253r0 on the subject of protection against a Spoof AP.
I am considering proposing the following text for insertion into 21/1848 Requirements document:
- 11bi shall define a mechanism for a BPE AP to be identified such that a BPE Client can confirm that the AP is not a spoof AP. Hence, the BPE Client will not send an Association Request and reveal its
presence.
I welcome any suggestions or comments
Thanks
Graham
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