IEEE P802.15
Wireless Personal Area Networks

Project	IEEE P802.15 Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs)		
Title	**IEEE P802-15_TG3 RSA Security Suite**		
Date Submitted	[August 2, 2002]		
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Re:	802.15.3 TG3 Letter Ballot Draft D10		
Abstract	[This document represents the text for the RSA security suite for inclusion in the 802.15.3 draft.]		
Purpose	[This document is intended to satisfy the requirements from 02/323r0 to provide an RSA security suite that includes a mode 2 sub-suite and a mode 3 sub-suite using X.509 certificates. This includes the text for the security suite itself along with changes that should be made to other portions of the standard if necessary.]		
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Author's note: The following changes before clause 1 of this document are specified to integrate the ECMQV, RSA and NTRU security suites as they now stand into the draft.

Author's note: The public key object information element in clause 7.4.17 should have the length of the length field changed from 1 byte to 2 bytes to accommodate public key objects that may be longer than 253 octets. Replace figure 41 with the following figure.

octets: L_n	**2**	**2**	**1**
Public-key object	Public-key object type	Length (=2+L_n)	Element ID

Figure 1—Public key object information element

Author's note: Add the following entries to the table in clause 7.5.2.1: RSA-OAEP Raw 1024, X.509 certificate. Recommend removing the entry for ECC X.509 certificate since this would be a subset of X.509 certificate.

Author's note: Remove the entries for "Auth response" and "Challenge Response" from Table 81. These entries will be added to each security suite individually. This should allow the ECMQV protocol to be included without the added penalty of computing a proof-of-possession of the management key outside of the MQV protocol.

Author's note: For the reasons described in the above comment remove the "Challenge response generation" and "Authentication response generation" entries from table 82 and include those operations in each sub-suite.

Author's note: Since MQV computes keys from seeds differently from the other protocols and since the CCM key is the same length as the seed itself, all security suites have been changed so that they now transport the key directly, rather than transporting a seed. To accommodate this change, remove the entry for "Payload protection key derivation" from table 82, include a method of generating the management key within each sub-suite, and replace references to transporting seeds with references to transporting keys in the distribute key and request key protocols.

Author's note: Replace the EncryptedSeed entry in table 12 with the following entry:

Table 1—MLME-REQUEST-KEY primitive parameters

Name	Type	Valid Range	Description
EncryptedKey	Octet String	Any valid CCM key as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3}.	The encrypted value of the key to be used for payload protection for this relationship.

Author's note: Replace the term EncryptedSeed with the term EncryptedKey in 6.3.8.2.2.

Author's note: Replace the term seed with the term key in 6.3.8.3.

Author's note: Replace the term EncryptedSeed with the term EncryptedKey in the semantics table in 6.3.8.3.

Author's note: Replace the term EncryptedSeed with the term EncryptedKey in the semantics table in 6.3.8.4.

Author's note: Replace the EncryptedSeed entry in table 13 with the entry in table 1 above.

Author's note: Replace the term EncryptedSeed with the term EncryptedKey in the semantics table in 6.3.9.1.

Author's note: Replace the term EncryptedSeed with the term EncryptedKey in the semantics table in 6.3.9.2.

Author's note: Replace the term seed with the term key in figure 58.

Author's note: Replace the last sentence in clause 7.5.2.6 with the following text:

The encrypted key is as defined in the security suite, {xref - 10.2.5}.

Author's note: Replace the term seed with the term key in figure 59.

Author's note: Replace the last sentence in clause 7.5.2.7 with the text above for 7.5.2.6.

Author's note: Change the wording of the first step in figure 145 to the following text and change each instance of the use of the word 'seed' to the word 'key':

Security manager selects a key that is used as the new payload protection key.

Author's note: Change each instance of the use of the word 'seed' to the word 'key' in figure 146.

Author's note: Change the last sentence of 9.7.5 to the following text:

This key is the payload protection key that is generated by the security manager.

Author's note: Remove the entries for Seed_D and Seed_G from table 55.

Author's note: Remove steps to generate Keys_D from Seed_D in figure 149 and replace text for obtaining the seed with the following text:

Performs operations on challenges to obtain shared key Keys_D.

Author's note: Replace the term 'seed' with the term 'Keys' in table 64.

Author's note: Replace use of the seed in figure 155 with use of the key.

Author's note: Replace the term 'seed' with the term 'Keys' in table 66.

Author's note: Replace use of the seed in figure 157 with use of the key.

Author's note: Remove "Seed_G - OR -" from table 72.

Author's note: Remove "or calculate Keys_G from Seed_G from figure 166.

Author's note: Change the "Encrypted seed" entry in table 81 to the following entry:

Table 2—Symmetric cryptography frame object formats

Notation	Length	Value	Description
Encrypted key	16	Variable	The encrypted key consists of the result of the encryption of a 16-byte key (not including the integrity code) using CCM encryption as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3}.

Author's note: Change the "Seed encryption operation" entry in table 82 to the following entry:

Table 3—Symmetric cryptographic operations

Operation	Specification
Key encryption operation	The key for key transport (in the key request, {xref - 9.9.4}, or distribute key, {xref - 9.9.3} protocols) is encrypted using CCM authentication and encryption on the key as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} using the management payload protection key with the entire command frame up to the encrypted key field as the authentication data input *a* and the 16-byte pre-encrypted key as the plaintext input *m* for encryption.

Author's note: Change the term 'seed' to 'key' in table C.1.

1. Security Suite Specifications

1.1 Security suite selections

1.1.1 OID selections

Author's note: The following entry should be added to the security suites table in clause 10.2.1.

Table 4—Security suites

Security Suite Name	OID Name	OID Number	DER Encoding
RSA-OAEP 1024-1	rsa-oaep-sec-suite-1	id-802-15-3-security-suites 3	0x060728C4620F030103

Author's note: The following entries should be added to the OIDs for sub-suites table in clause 10.2.1.

Table 5—OIDs for sub-suites

Sub-suite Name	OID Name	OID Number	DER Encoding
RSA-OAEP Raw 1	rsa-oaep-raw-1	rsa-oaep-sec-suite-1 1	0x060828C4620F03010301
RSA-OAEP X509 1	rsa-oaep-x509-1	rsa-oaep-sec-suite-1 2	0x060828C4620F03010302

Author's note: The security services provided by the proposed RSA security suite is the same as the other proposals, so there should be no change to the text in 10.2.2

Author's note: The following sub-clause should be added to clause 10 as the full text for the RSA-OAEP 1024-1 security suite.

1.2 RSA-OAEP 1024-1 security suite

The following sub-clauses define the security operations that are performed for the security suite RSA-OAEP 1024-1. The symmetric operations performed in this security suite are those specified in sub-clause {xref 10.2.4}. The public key and authentication operations are specified in the following sub-clause {xref 1.2.1}.

1.2.1 Public-key and authentication building blocks

The following cryptographic primitives and data elements are defined for use in all sub-suites of RSA-OAEP 1024-1.

1.2.1.1 RSA domain parameters

All RSA objects and cryptographic operations used in this security suite shall use the following parameters as described in {xref PKCS#1}. The RSA modulus is defined to be an integer of length k = 128 octets, or 1024-bits.

1.2.1.2 RSA key pair

An RSA public key in this security suite consists of the modulus n and the public exponent e. The modulus n shall be an integer of length k as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.1}. The public exponent e shall be an integer less than 2^{32}. The private key is information that allows its owner to find e^{th} roots mod n. The private key may take one of a number of forms; see {xref PKCS#1} for more details. The choice of representation of the private key does not affect interoperability and is out of scope.

1.2.1.3 RSA raw public key

An RSA raw public key in this security suite is defined to be the octet string consisting of the modulus n, converted to an octet string using I2OSP as specified in {xref PKCS#1} parameterized with output length k as defined in subclause {xref 1.2.1.1}, concatenated with the public exponent e, converted to an octet string using I2OSP as specified in {xref PKCS#1} parameterized with output length 4.

1.2.1.4 RSA-OAEP encryption and decryption

The RSA-OAEP encryption scheme in this security suite shall be performed as specified in {xref PKCS#1}. The encryption and decryption operations shall be parameterized by the following inputs. The label L shall be the empty string. The hash function Hash shall be SHA-1 as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.5}. The mask generation function MGF shall be MGF1 as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.6}. The output of the encryption operation shall be an octet string of length k as defined in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.1} and as described in {xref PKCS#1}.

1.2.1.5 SHA-1 cryptographic hash

The SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm used in this security suite shall be performed as specified in the FIPS 180-2 draft standard {xref FIP180}.

1.2.1.6 MGF1 cryptographic mask generation function

The MGF1 cryptographic mask generation function used in this security suite shall be performed as specified in Annex B.2.1 of {xref PKCS#1}. This operation shall be parameterized by the hash function SHA-1 as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.5}

1.2.1.7 RSA X.509 certificate

The X.509 digital certificate format and verification used in this security suite shall be as specified by the PKIX RFC 3280 {xref PKIX}. These certificates shall contain an RSA public key as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.2}. These certificates shall be signed using the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature algorithm as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.8}. The ASN.1 encoding for the public key and signature shall be as specified in {xref PKCS#1}. The subject field of the X.509 certificate shall be NULL and the subjectAltName shall consist of the PrintableString encoding of the hexadecimal representation of the 48-bit IEEE MAC address of the device.

1.2.1.8 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digital signatures and verification

The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digital signature algorithm used in this security suite shall be performed as specified in {xref PKCS#1}. The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature algorithm operations shall be performed using the domain parameters specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.1} and RSA key pairs as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.2}. The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature and verification algorithms shall be parameterized by the following input. The hash function Hash shall be SHA-1 as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.5}.

1.2.2 RSA-OAEP Raw 1 sub-suite

RSA-OAEP Raw 1 is a mode 2 sub-suite of the RSA-OAEP 1024-1 security suite. The cryptographic building blocks for the RSA-OAEP Raw 1 sub-suite are selected from the public-key cryptographic building blocks defined for the RSA-OAEP 1024-1 security suite. The OID for this sub-suite is specified in {xref Table 5}. The following sub-clauses specify the public-key and authentication related objects for this sub-suite.

1.2.2.1 Public-key and authentication data formats

The following table specifies the length and meaning of the public-key cryptography and authentication related security suite specific data elements from clause {xref 7}. The operations performed to obtain the variable data values are specified in a separate sub-clause.

Table 6—Public-key frame object formats

Notation	Length	Value	Description
PublicKeyObjectType	2	See {xref 7.5.2.1}	An RSA raw public key as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.3}. The value is the entry for RSA-OAEP Raw 1024 in {xref 7.5.2.1}.
PublicKeyObjectLength	2	132	The length of the RSA raw public key.
PublicKeyObject	132	Variable	The particular instance of the RSA raw public key.
OIDLength	1	10	The length of the DER encoding of the OID rsa-oaep-raw-1 as specified in {xref Table 5}.
OID	10	OID Value	The DER encoding of the OID rsa-oaep-raw-1 as specified in {xref Table 5}.
Challenge	128	Variable	The result of the RSA-OAEP encryption of the 16-octet challenge as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.4.}.

Table 6—Public-key frame object formats

Auth response	8	Variable	The auth response consists of the encrypted integrity code that is the result of a CCM computation as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the encryption data being the empty string (NULL).
ChallengeResponse	8	Variable	The challenge response consists of the encrypted integrity code that is the result of a CCM computation as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the encryption data being the empty string (NULL).

1.2.2.2 Public key and authentication cryptographic operations

The following table specifies the public key cryptography and authentication related operations for the authentication protocol frames defined in clause {xref 7}.:

Table 7—Authentication related operations

Use	Operation
Verification of Public-Key	The ID and public-key received during the authentication protocol is verified by generating the SHA-1 hash of the device address concatenated with the RSA raw public key of the device as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.5}and comparing it to the hash of the ID and public key stored in the MAC PIB. If the hash is not in the PIB, the public key is passed to the DME to establish trust by other means.
Challenge generation	The challenges generated during the authentication protocol are computed by performing an RSA-OAEP encryption as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.4} on a fresh, randomly generated 16-byte challenge using the other device's public key.
Challenge decryption	The challenge decryption operation is performed using RSA-OAEP decryption as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.4} on the received challenge.
Management key generation (for authentication protocol)	The 32-byte seed for the management key consists of the decrypted challenge from the security manager, concatenated with the decrypted challenge of the DEV. The management key for the relationship is generated from the seed by first calculation the SHA-1 hash as specified in 1.2.1.5 on the 32-byte seed and then setting the key to be the truncation of the result to the first 128-bits.
Challenge response generation	The challenge response is generated by computing the encrypted integrity code with the payload protection key using CCM authentication and encryption as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the entire authentication protocol up to that point as the authentication data input *a* and the empty string as the plaintext input *m* for encryption.
Authentication response generation	The authentication response is generated by computing the encrypted integrity code with the payload protection key using CCM authentication and encryption as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the entire authentication protocol up to that point as the authentication data input *a* and the empty string as the plaintext input *m* for encryption.

1.2.3 RSA-OAEP X509 1 sub-suite

RSA-OAEP X509 1 is a mode 3 sub-suite of the RSA-OAEP 1024-1 security suite. The cryptographic building blocks for RSA-OAEP X509 1 sub-suite are selected from the public-key cryptographic building blocks defined for the RSA-OAEP 1024-1 security suite. The OID for this sub-suite is specified in {xref Table 5}. The following sub-clauses specify the public-key and authentication related objects for this sub-suite.

1.2.3.1 Public-key and authentication data formats

The following table specifies the length and meaning of the public-key cryptography and authentication related security suite specific data elements from clause {xref 7}. The operations performed to obtain the variable data values are specified in a separate sub-clause.

Table 8—Public-key frame object formats

Notation	Length	Value	Description
PublicKeyObjectType	2	See {xref 7.5.2.1}	An RSA X.509 certificate as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.7}. The value is the entry for X.509 certificate in {xref 7.5.2.1}.
PublicKeyObjectLength	2	Variable	The length of the particular instance of the X.509 certificate.
PublicKeyObject	Variable	Variable	The particular instance of the X.509 certificate.
OIDLength	1	10	The length of the DER encoding of the OID rsa-oaep-x509-1 as specified in {xref Table 5}.
OID	10	OID Value	The DER encoding of the OID rsa-oaep-x509-1 as specified in {xref Table 5}.
Challenge	128	Variable	The result of the RSA-OAEP encryption of the 16-octet challenge as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.4.}.
Auth response	8	Variable	The auth response consists of the encrypted integrity code that is the result of a CCM computation as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the encryption data being the empty string (NULL).
ChallengeResponse	8	Variable	The challenge response consists of the encrypted integrity code that is the result of a CCM computation as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the encryption data being the empty string (NULL).

1.2.3.2 Public key and authentication cryptographic operations

The following table specifies the public key cryptography and authentication related operations for the authentication protocol frames defined in clause {xref 7}.:

Table 9—Authentication related operations

Use	Operation
Verification of Public-Key	The X.509 certificate received during the authentication protocol is verified by retrieving the appropriate CA key and verifying the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature as specified in clause {xref 1.2.1.8}on the certificate. The device shall verify that the MAC address in the subjectAltName of the certificate matches the MAC address that the certificate was received from. The device shall extract the public key for use in the authentication protocol. There are several other checks that should be performed by the device if possible to ensure the security properties of the certificate including a CRL check, validity period verification and the key use field check. In addition, the device shall check that the device in the certificate is included in the ACL. If the device is not in the PIB, the certificate is passed to the DME to establish trust by other means.
Challenge generation	The challenges generated during the authentication protocol are computed by performing an RSA-OAEP encryption as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.4} on a fresh, randomly generated 16-byte challenge using the other device's public key.
Challenge decryption	The challenge decryption operation is performed using RSA-OAEP decryption as specified in sub-clause {xref 1.2.1.4} on the received challenge.
Management key generation (for authentication protocol)	The 32-byte seed for the management key consists of the decrypted challenge from the security manager, concatenated with the decrypted challenge of the DEV. The management key for the relationship is generated from the seed by first calculation the SHA-1 hash as specified in 1.2.1.5 on the 32-byte seed and then setting the key to be the truncation of the result to the first 128-bits.
Challenge response generation	The challenge response is generated by computing the encrypted integrity code with the payload protection key using CCM authentication and encryption as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the entire authentication protocol up to that point as the authentication data input *a* and the empty string as the plaintext input *m* for encryption.
Authentication response generation	The authentication response is generated by computing the encrypted integrity code with the payload protection key using CCM authentication and encryption as specified in {xref - 10.2.4.3} with the entire authentication protocol up to that point as the authentication data input *a* and the empty string as the plaintext input *m* for encryption.

2. References

Author's note: The following normative references should be included in clause 2.

PKCS#1v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002[1]

R. Housley, et. al., RFC 3280 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, April 2002[2]

[1]PKCS standards are available from RSA Security at 174 Middlesex Turnpike, Bedford, MA 01730, USA and online at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/index.html.

[2]IETF RFCs are available from the IETF online at http://www.ietf.org/.