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Title	Security Negotiation Parameters in the SBC-REQ/RSP Procedure		
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Re:	IEEE P802.16e/D6		
Abstract	The document contains suggestions on the changes into IEEE 802.16e/D6 that would provide privacy capabilities parameters to negotiate between a MS and the BS.		
Purpose	Adoption of proposed changes i	into P802.16e/D6	
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Security Negotiation Parameters in the SBC-REQ/RSP Procedure Seokheon Cho, Taeyong Lee, Sunhwa Lim, and Chulsik Yoon ETRI

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Introduction

Both MS and BS shall negotiate the authorization policy by using the Authorization Policy Support field. Both of them shall also know message authentication code mode, e.g. selecting one of OMAC and HMAC from the Authorization Policy Support field. However, the negotiation of message authentication code mode should be performed by other field that is independent from the Authorization Policy Support field, since the message authentication code mode level is lower than the authorization key level obtained through the authorization procedure.

In addition, there are two modes related to the EAP, e.g. EAP transfer mode and Authenticated EAP transfer mode.

It is necessary to make a filed to contain parameters related to privacy capabilities.

This contribution proposed a way to solve the above problems.

Proposed changes to IEEE 802.16e/D6

6.3.2.3.23 MS Basic Capability Request (SBC-REQ) message [Insert at the end of 6.3.2.3.23:]

Security Negotiation Parameters (see 11.8.4) Authorization Policy Support (see 11.8.4)

6.3.2.3.24 MS Basic Capability Response (SBC-RSP) message [Insert at the end of 6.3.2.3.24:]

Security Negotiation Parameters (see 11.8.4) Authorization Policy Support (see 11.8.4)

[Change sub-clauses 11.8.4 - 11.8.6 as follows]

11.8.4 Security Negotiation Parameters

This field is a compound attribute indicating security capabilities to negotiate before performing the initial authorization procedure and the reauthorization procedure.

Туре	Length	Value (compound)	Scope
25	Variable	The compound field contains the sub-attributes as defined in Table xxx.	SBC-REQ SBC-RSP

Attribute	Contents
PKM Version Support	Version of privacy sublayer supported
Authorization Policy Support	Authorization policy to support
Message Authentication Code Mode	Message authentication code to support
PN Window Size	Size capability of the receiver PN window per SAID

11.8.5 11.8.4.1 PKM Version Support

This field indicates a PKM version. A bit value of 0 indicates "not supported" while 1 indicates "supported". Both an SS and a BS should negotiate only one PKM version.

Туре	Length	Value	Scope
26		Bit# 0: PKM version 1	SBC REQ
25.1	1	Bit# 1: PKM version 2	SBC RSP
		Bit# 2-7: Reserved. Set to 0	

11.8.4 11.8.4.2 Authorization Policy Support

This field indicates authorization policy used by the MS and BS to negotiate and synchronize. A bit value of 0 indicates "not supported" while 1 indicates "supported."

Туре	Length	Value	Scope
5.25		Bit# 0: RSA-based authorization at the initial network entry	SBC-REQ
25.2		Bit# 1: EAP-based authorization at the initial network entry	SBC-RSP
		Bit# 2: OMAC supported (if set to 0, HMAC is the default)	
		Bit# 2: Authenticated EAP-based authorization at the initial	
	1	network entry	
	1	Bit# 3: Reserved. Set to 0	
		Bit# 4: RSA-based authorization at re-entry	
		Bit# 5: EAP-based authorization at re-entry	
		Bit# 6: Authenticated EAP-based authorization at re-entry	
		Bit# 3- 7: Reserved. Set to 0	

Authenticated EAP-based authorization basically means that a message containing EAP payload is protected by OMAC Digest. The OMAC_KEY_U and OMAC_KEY_D are generated with the EIK obtained from RSA-based authorization or EAP-based authorization.

Bit# 4 – 6 are only applied to the SBC-REQ message. Those bits shall be set to 0 in the SBC-RSP message.

11.8.4.3 Message Authentication Code Mode

This field indicates a MAC (Message Authentication Code) mode that MS supports. Both MS and BS shall determine and use a MAC mode. A bit value of 0 indicates "not supported" while 1 indicates "supported." If this attribute is not present, only HMAC is supported.

Туре	Length	Value
25.3		Bit# 0: HMAC
		Bit# 1: OMAC
	1	Bit# 2: 64-bit short-HMAC*
	1	Bit# 3: 80-bit short-HMAC*
		Bit# 4: 96-bit short-HMAC*
		Bit# 5-7: Reserved. Set to 0

* Note: If the short-HMAC mode is selected, then the short-HMAC tuple shall be applied to the following messages: MOB_SLP-REQ/RSP, MOB_SCAN-REQ/RSP, MOB_MSHO-REQ, MOB_BSHO-REQ/RSP, MOB_HO-IND, RNG-REQ/RSP. Otherwise, the HMAC tuple shall be applied.

11.8.6 11.8.4.4 PN Window Size

Specifies the size capability of the receiver PN window per SAID. The receiver shall track PNs within this window to prevent replay attacks (see 7.5.1.2.4).

Туре	Length	Value	Scope
44. 25.4	2	PN Window Size in PNs	SBC-REQ, SBC-RSP

[Change one row in Table 368 in the section 11.9 as follows] 11.9 PKM-REQ/RSP management message encodings

Table 368-PKM attributes types

Туре	PKM attribute	
22	Version reserved	

[Change the sub-clause 11.9.13 as follows] 11.9.13 Security capabilities

Description: The Security-Capabilities attribute contains is a compound attribute whose subattributes identify the version of PKM an SS supports and the cryptographic suite(s) an SS supports.

Туре	Length	Value (compound)
19	Variable	The Compound field contains the subattributes as defined in Table 372.

Table 372-Security-capabilities subattributes

Attribute	Contents
Cryptographic-Suite-List	List of supported cryptographic suites
Version	Version of Privacy supported

11.9.16 Version

Table 372-Security-capabilities subattributes

Value	Description
θ	Reserved
4	PKM(Initial statndard release)
2-255	Reserved

Type	Length	Value (compound)
22	1	A 1 byte code identifying a version of PKM security as defined in Table 377.