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Re:	IEEE P802.16REVe/D7 SB re circ
Abstract	EAP channel binding support for 802.16e
Purpose	Adopt changes.
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# EAP Parameter and Channel Binding support in 802.16e

Jeff Mandin (Runcom)

### 1. **Problem statement**

As described in the EAP keying draft (draft 6 section 7.3), 802.16e - as an "EAP lower layer" - should provide a mechanism to enable the Peer and Authenticator to confirm the security parameters they have received about each other (via the EAP method and AAA protocol respectively).

These parameters would include the identity of the Authenticator, as well as the additional parameters that can be exchanged by EAP methods supporting channel binding (RFC 3748 section 7.15).

[We note parenthetically that in the case of FBSS, a single authentication entity supports multiple BS interfaces and can perform FBSS among them (ie. a single authentication suffices for all of the interfaces). This is the primary (perhaps the only) case in 802.16e where a single authenticator supports multiple instances of the 802.16 MAC/PHY.]

# 2. Overview of solution

We add fields to the SA-TEK-Challenge, SA-TEK-Request, and SA-Challenge tuple TLV so as to enable bidirectional confirmation of identities and additonal parameters that are communicated via "channel binding" methods.

# 3. Text changes

#### [Add the following to table 37f following the AKID attribute:]

AuthenticatorId | the identity of the EAP authenticator associated with the BS

#### [section 7.8.1 Add a new item in between 2 and 3:]

3. If the MS received the AuthenticatorId and other channel parameters via the EAP method, it shall check whether BS supplied these same parameters in the SA-Challenge. If the AuthenticatorId or parameters do not match or were not supplied, the MS SHOULD log the event as a possible security breach and the MS MAY elect to terminate communications with the BS.

#### [section 7.8.1 Add a new item in between 4 and 5:]

5. If the BS received channel parameters (such as AAA attributes) via the EAP method, it shall check whether MS supplied these same parameters in the SA-Challenge. If the channel parameters do not match or were not

supplied, the BS SHOULD log the event as a possible security breach and the BS MAY elect to terminate communications with the MS.

### [Add the following to page 528, line 62 following the AKID attribute:]

AuthenticatorId | code | variable | the identity of the EAP authenticator associated with the BS

[insert new section 11.9.31:]

#### EAP AuthenticatorId

Description: The Identity of the Authenticator associated with the BS. Typically this is the value that is contained in the NAS\_Identifier AAA attribute

Type   Length	Value
Tbd   variable	Identity of the EAP Authenticator associated with the BS