RE: [802.21] Mutual authentication requirements in SSG
Hi Lily, Maryna, Peretz,Yoshi,
Thank you for the responses, helping us to make
progress here.
Maryna, Peretz, regarding the use of MIIS in
unauthenticated state... that use case is supported for NWDS acceleration by .16
and .11. We have assumed that the use of the MIIS at L2 would mean that
the PoA would not trust the MN even if the MN is currently associated to
the PoA's network through a different PoA. Could it be possible for the MN to
already trust the new PoA however, if it is in the same network as the current
PoA? What would it take to make that a possibility? Of course the mobile node
may use the information as a hint even if there is no authentication (as is done
today with the beacon)
For this use case, one of the main concerns expressed
in .11 was that of DoS attack from the MN. Were there similar concerns from
.16?
Lily, regarding use of MIH when the MN is authenticated
to the network, you mentioned that for most correct usage, the four aspects of
1,2,3 plus replay protection must be mandatory to use, regardless of the
transport level use of those four aspects. As a result, we may have L2 use of
these four protections, then L3 use of them (e.g. ipsec), then the MSTP layer,
and then the MIH layer, is that what we are suggesting?
BR,
Michael
We have a few relative security aspects:
1.
Mutual authentication (entity authentication).
2. Key establishment for
message protection.
3. Message protections (encryption and integrity
protection).
If we want to make sure that MN receives information from
a correct source, then we have to bind 1-2-3 together so that the message is
authenticated by the entity which have authenticated in 1. Entity
authentication does not imply message authentication (integrity
protection). That is, we cannot depend on transport protection, since
the transport layer ID for the service unit may not be the same as the MIH
ID. The transport layer mutual authentication may not mean MIH mutual
authentication. Furthermore, the protection may be applied hop-by-hop instead
of end-to-end. The information receiver may not be able to get any assurance
on where the information comes from.
There are some options if
MN can access a PKI which is media independent and if the protection is
applied at MIH protocol, then the information can be authenticated by digital
signatures, verifiable by MN without step 1 and step 2 we listed in the above.
In this case, other cautions must be taken, for example, to prevent re-play
attacks.
However, these are just IFs. We need discuss how applicable
these IFs are.
Regards,
Lily
At 04:23 AM 2/5/2008,
komarova wrote:
Hi all,
MN to IS
authentication may be optional, but IS to MN authentication should be
mandatory in order to provide guarantee that the MN receives information
from a correct source.
Best regards,
Maryna
Komarova
Yoshihiro Ohba a écrit :
Hi Perets,
This topic is
important for SSG TR.
On Sun, Feb 03, 2008 at 01:54:07AM -0600,
Feder, Peretz (Peretz) wrote:
Michael: We actually were
planning to use IS in 802.16 before the 802.16
full authentication,
if now required we may loose the pre-authentication
network entry
flexibility.
This leads to an issue
on whether the security feature to be defined
by a new project (if
approved) should be mandatory to use or option to
use. We may
need to define it as option to use at least for IS,
considering the
802.16 usage mentioned above as well as GAS usage in
802.11u. We
may need to investigate the same issue for ES and CS
as
well.
Regards,
Yoshihiro Ohba
________________________________
From: Michael G
Williams [ mailto:Michael.G.Williams@NOKIA.COM] Sent: Friday,
February 01, 2008 8:15 PM
To:
STDS-802-21@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: [802.21] Mutual authentication
requirements in SSG
Hi,
In the security study group, we
discussed the need for MIHF level
authentication.
There were a
few topics in this area:
What do people see as serving as the basis
for credentials for the MIHF?
Is it possible to reuse the
network access authentication or MSTP
transport authentication for
the MIHF level?
Is mutual authentication always required, or is one
way sufficient for
some applications?
Is the need for
authentication different between the four different
services
(management, ES, IS, CE)?
Comments? Proposed solutions?
Best
Regards, Michael