Thread Links | Date Links | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Thread Prev | Thread Next | Thread Index | Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index |
Hello folks,
--> Are MIH_LL and MIH_N2N_LL messages
supposed to contain opaque LL protocol messages? ==> If so, they need the
following additional information: * Media
type * LL
source+destination/MAC addresses * Possibly
other framing fields which would encapsulate an actual LL
message across a single link ==> If not, need an
explanation about relationship to LL ==> Anyway, these do not
fit readily into the design space of
"SID/Opcode/AID" as detailed in Section 8.4.1 and Table 23. --> The intention in Section 11.6 has
been enable L2-oriented signaling, but still enable SPoS to
identify the TPoS and possibly also TPoA. For this purpose: ==> UE has to be allowed
to provide hints to SPoS for the selection various IEs from Table
G.1 (Information element identifiers) containing
LINK_TYPE, DCD_UCD values from Table F.10
(Data types for location) values from Table F.11
(Value field format of PoA location ...) values from Table F.14 (Network type and subtype representation)
==> Probably need
alternate "MIH Message IDs" instead of MIH_*LL: for example:
SPoS_MHTN_SA_ESTAB
SPoS_TNMH_SA_ESTAB But I do not know the best way to
specify the parameters. According to the Data type name:
ENCR_BLOCK Derived from: OCTET_STRING
Primitive-style recipes: SPoS_TNMH_SA_ESTAB.request
(
TransportType,
SourceAddress,
DestinationAddress, MN_ID,
NONCE_VALUE, ENCR_BLOCK, ) SPoS_MHTN_SA_ESTAB.request
(
TransportType,
SourceAddress,
DestinationAddress, TPoS_ID,
NONCE_VALUE, ENCR_BLOCK, ) IE_CONTAINER recipe:
SPoS_TNMH_SA_ESTAB
MN_ID, /* MN_networkaccessID */
NONCE_VALUE, /* nonce, see section .... */
ENCR_BLOCK /* K_tpos XOR computed_value */
SPoS_MHTN_SA_ESTAB TPoS_ID, /* TPoS
IP Addr */
NONCE_VALUE, /* nonce, see section .... */
ENCR_BLOCK /* K_tpos XOR computed_value */ MIH Message-style recipes: SPoS_TNMH_SA_ESTAB: MIH Header Fields (SID=Q,
Opcode=Q, AID=Q) Source Identifier = sending
MIHF ID (Source MIHF ID TLV) Destination Identifier =
receiving MIHF ID (Destination MIHF ID TLV) MN_networkaccessID (MN_ID
TLV),
Nonce (NONCE_VALUE TLV),
/* see section .... */ Encrypted K_tpos
(ENCR_BLOCK) /* K_tpos XOR computed_value */ SPoS_MHTN_SA_ESTAB: MIH Header Fields (SID=Q,
Opcode=Q, AID=Q) Source Identifier = sending
MIHF ID (Source MIHF ID TLV) Destination Identifier =
receiving MIHF ID (Destination MIHF ID TLV) TPoS_ID
(TPoS_ID TLV),
Nonce (NONCE_VALUE TLV),
/* see section .... */ Encrypted K_tpos
(ENCR_BLOCK) /* K_tpos XOR computed_value */
Annex N: - Is it necessary to have two rounds of
authentication and establishing security
association with MN? Why does Annex N figure 2 show
installing ky at MN for TPoA? Isn't that key known as
MSPMRK? Shouldn't it be derived from MIRK? - Am not sure about the point of Annex N,
figure 4 = Need to rewrite the text to emphasize
derivation of MSMPRK from MIRK, and verify that MSMPRK is
to be installed at TPoA as part of the initial transaction
and exchange. MIRK is to be transferred to MN, and
MSPMRK derived from MIRK.
Charlie
Perkins 本邮件及其附件含有华为公司的保密信息,仅限于发送给上面地址中列出的个人或群组。禁 |