Re: [LinkSec] Cascading Link by Link Authentication?
Dear DJ:
The trust model that is underlying your operational description is one with
- complete trust in the authentication server
- full transitivity of trust: if A trusts B and B trusts C, then A trusts C.
From my perspective, this trust model is very inflexible and often unworkable.
This trust model falls apart in the event one of the links is
untrusted/untrustworthy or becomes so.
Rene
"Johnston, Dj" <dj.johnston@intel.com> on 05/19/2003 06:01:57 PM
To: stds-802-linksec@ieee.org
cc: (bcc: Rene Struik/Certicom)
Subject: [LinkSec] Cascading Link by Link Authentication?
I have been wondering if the following is true for the sort of linksec
we have been talking about..
There is a bridged 802 network.
Somewhere, on one of the bridges is an authentication agent.
We decline to send data via untrusted bridges.
Bridges become trusted by talking to the authentication agent.
So in the first instance, only the bridges attached to the link on which
the authentication agent can form the necessary trust relationships by
talking to the authentication agent directly.
Then the bridges attached to the links on which those trusted bridges
can do the auth thing by talking through the trusted bridges. And so on.
So authentication of bridges would have to happen in a cascading fashion
through the network. This might have a bearing on the time to
reestablish the trustworthyness of bridges, depending on where in the
hierarchy a change in the network state took place.
DJ
David Johnston
Intel Corporation
Chair, IEEE 802 Handoff ECSG
Email : dj.johnston@intel.com
Tel : 503 380 5578 (Mobile)
Tel : 503 264 3855 (Office)