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Fw: [LinkSec] presentation FrameFormats (DJ Johnston, Intel, Sep 16, 2003)




Hi DJ:

Thanks for your clear presentation. Three observations on your presentation (pruning the data expansion) and one additional remark (cross-802 use of LinkSec):

- The length of the PN field can be allowed to vary, if part of its value is already known on the recipient's side.
- The length of the ICV field can be allowed to vary, rather than chosen as fixed.
- There are situations where one does not want encryption and authenticity, but rather only data authenticity (obvious example: export control).
The combined effect of taking these observations into consideration is that the 18 bytes = 144 bits of data expansion introduced by adding frame protection can be trimmed down considerably (say, from 18 bytes to 11 bytes, if one where to send 8 byte PNs in compressed format).

These measures are detailed in my IEEE 802.15.4 presentation 02/474r2 (posted Jan 2003), where these mechanisms are proposed to send a 1-byte compressed PN value rather than the full-length 4-byte PN value (thus, saving 3 bytes in security status information overhead) and to allow flexibility as to the protection level required (e.g., encryption and/of authenticity, the latter at different levels, viz. 0, 32-bit, 64-bit, 128-bit). The total cost hereof for 802.15.4 is 4-bit indicator info (1 bit compression identification, 3-bit protection level identification), but benefit is flexibility towards what applications can bear, both in terms of communication overhead (data expansion due to frame protection) and computational overhead (no encryption if not needed). Again, in the context of 802.15.4, there might be more than one application running on each device and, whereas applications might fix the protection level among themselves, this does not necessarily mean that each device runs at a fixed protection level (indeed, there might even be applications that do *not* require security, whereas others do, running on the same device). This holds more general than just in the 802.15.4 setting (which, arguably, is the most constrained wireless standard under the IEEE 802 umbrella).

One additional remark (re Slide 14 of your presentation): you suggest that negotiation over provider bridge should pick longest PN field if there is more than one option. This would force the more constrained device (read: 802.15.4) to reserve the longest PN fields in memory. This seems to be the wrong way around: one should put the extra burden with devices that can afford this, not with devices that are already operating on their toes. Anything else will be hard to accept for users of standards that were designed to fit the needs of constrained implementation environments. Moreover, there is a practical limitation, e.g., 802.15.4 security does not work with nonces/frame counters of size more than 4-bytes; no space available for more). A better option seems to be (with a security suite with an increasing nonce in mind, such as CCM) to adopt an approach, such as the following (still have to elaborate on details):
- devices send frames using nonces with a length that fits their own capability (i.e., 4-bytes for 802.15.4 and, possibly, 8-bytes for 802.3).
- devices that receive nonces from a device A store these according to the minimum of their own capability and that of the sending device (i.e., if storage comes at premium, then store a shorter nonce corresponding to sending device A).
- when updating the nonce value, an "overflow/infinity" value is generated if the increased nonce value does not fit the rules as stipulated aobve.
Consequences:
- devices within one standard use fixed nonce/seq counter sizes, so situation same as now.
- devices that talk accross bridge with sending dev 8-byte nonce and receiving device 4-byte nonce: sending device can update nonce value as long as it fits within 8-byte format; recipient device accepts nonce if it fits within 4-byte format (i.e., represent 32-bit integer and unequal to "infinity" value 0xffffffff).
Note: There is one caveat with this approach, which is that the formatting depends on the capabilities of the underlying MAC of the sending device (maybe, we can indicate this in the header as contextual info: indication that allows inference of size of nonce field).

Rene


"Johnston, Dj" <dj.johnston@intel.com>
Sent by: owner-stds-802-linksec@majordomo.ieee.org

09/16/2003 11:32 AM

To
"Hal Keen" <Hal.Keen@att.net>, "Dolors Sala" <dolors@ieee.org>
cc
<stds-802-linksec@ieee.org>
Subject
[LinkSec] RE: bounced giant message






As before, I've put the files on my impoverished website.

If you like open(ish) formats, try:
https://www.deadhat.com/linksec/Linksec_FrameFormats.pdf

Or if you like to lock your data in a monopolist's closed format, try:
https://www.deadhat.com/linksec/Linksec_FrameFormats.ppt

Regards,
DJ

David Johnston
Intel Corporation
Chair, IEEE 802 Handoff ECSG

Email : dj.johnston@intel.com
Tel   : 503 380 5578 (Mobile)
Tel   : 503 264 3855 (Office)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hal Keen [mailto:Hal.Keen@att.net]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2003 7:48 AM
> To: Dolors Sala
> Cc: Johnston, Dj
> Subject: bounced giant message
>
>
> Dolors,
>
> The message with the frame-format slides was nearly a quarter
> MB, way over
> the size limit for the reflector.
>
> I see you got a copy; can you post the file?
>
> Regards,
> Hal
> Hal.Keen@ieee.org
>
>