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Hi Graham, On 4/11/23, 2:05 PM, "G Smith" <gsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: Hi Mark, I think you are close. As we have not had any other proposals for an “opaque” ID scheme, and I think we may get comments on “what is the comparable security and privacy?”; maybe we make it a little stronger in Annex Z’s favor?
They are listed in the first paragraph in Annex Z: The requirements for using those procedures are that the identifier preclude tracking by third parties. In addition to satisfying those requirements, this scheme also provides for countermeasures to deal with traffic analysis, precludes cutting-and-pasting of identities into conversations, prevents the same identifier from being used on distinct ESSs, and has an acceptable security level based on the birthday paradox. It uses symmetric cryptography for speed and DOS resistance. It imposes minimal overhead on each frame and imposes minimal state retention requirements on an ESS (a single secret), and a binding of each unwrapped identity assigned to a STA and the current opaque device identifier provided to it. Now, we could make that a bulleted list of capabilities if that would make it more clear, but that's the general idea. The bennies of speed, DOS resistance, and minimal overhead are not, necessarily, security and privacy related so they
could be left out but the rest deal with specific attack vectors that we need to address in any solution offered.
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