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Hi Mike,
Thanks for the efforts on this pdt .
I just provide some high level comments here.
For PASN , as we discussed before, it's designed for the infrastructure network case at the very beginning, which can't meet the special requirement of MAPC . To avoid the over load of traditional PASN protocol, we add MAPC PASN procedure, in which each difference points is very carefully to clarify compared with the basic PASN protocol.
It doesn't work at all as you did in the pdt : strike it out totally but just leave some MAC address clarification.
For 802.1X authentication, there are only two authentication frames exchange during PTKSA derivation phase, which will cause additional security issue if you apply to MAPC case directly. We should change it to three authentication frames exchange in MAPC case as I did my PDT 25/1860r6.
Aslo , this is no association procedure in MAPC , but it seems there is based on in your pdt .
I don't see any additional use case covered by EPPKE , I don't understand why you want to introduce it to MAPC security. Just make the SPEC being more complicated.
Thanks
Best Regards
Jay Yang (杨志杰)
Hi all,
I posted the following document which updates and simplifies MAPC Security Negotiation and addresses 22 CIDs .Cheers,Mike
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